Dissecting the 8,000-million-baht soft power budget that has been scattered as small change across the bureaucratic system — examining the structure of THACCA versus South Korea's KOCCA, along with 3 solutions to overhaul Thailand's creative industry before the money goes to waste.
Series: Soft Power and the Fate of Thai Artists, EP.2 (Final Episode) — Dissecting the 8,000-Million-Baht Budget: Money Flowing Everywhere but Aimlessly. A Major Surgery Before It All Goes to Waste?
Over the past three decades, Thai artists from Nichkhun and Lisa to Milli and Nene Royal have all had to struggle to make their own way, while the Thai state has done nothing more than ride their wave — never building a genuinely supportive ecosystem. This exposes a deep structural wound at a time when the soft power campaign is becoming embedded in the bureaucracy, turning into a multi-billion-baht cake being sliced up and distributed across various ministries without direction, without measurable targets, and leaving training programmes worth hundreds of millions of baht to drain public funds — without ever having produced a single new star in the Thai music industry.
Why has South Korea used the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA) to build a world-class economic engine, while the Thai state has turned the Thailand Creative Culture Agency (THACCA) into nothing more than an event organiser? Follow along for a full, in-depth answer.
THACCA Transforms into "Scattered Small Change"
At this point, the National Soft Power Strategy Committee and the THACCA (Thailand Creative Culture Agency) project have not been dissolved along with the political transition. What has happened instead is a process of "structural transfer" — shifting from politically driven management under the Paetongtarn Shinawatra government into systematic embedding within the bureaucratic system. Meanwhile, the draft Creative Culture Promotion Act (THACCA Act), which has been pushed by the Creative Economy Agency (Public Organisation), or CEA, remains in the legislative process for elevation to "public organisation" status. The original structure has had its missions and budget dispersed into two main parts: the Creative Economy Agency (Public Organisation), or CEA, serving as the secretariat and bearing the strategic and central coordination functions, while the budget has been pushed into the regular work plans of the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Tourism and Sports, and the Ministry of Industry.
Budget Flowing, but Aimless
The real problem right now is the condition of "budget still in place, mechanisms still in place, but fragmented, directionless, and unmeasurable." The total funding that the public sector has allocated to soft-power-related projects throughout this period — covering the 2024–2026 budget years — has cumulatively surpassed 8,000 million baht, according to data from the Budget Bureau and policy-tracking analyses in the Policy Watch database by Thai PBS together with academic network partners and the King Prajadhipok's Institute. Looking further ahead to the long-term budget framework (the 2027–2028 budget plan), the budgetary figures being requested and embedded across various ministries are still set at as high as 3,000–4,000 million baht per year.
Here is a breakdown of the soft power budget structure dispersed across the bureaucracy:
• Music, film, drama, and series: Distributed to the Ministry of Culture (Department of Cultural Promotion). Based on the 2025 annual budget allocation announcement, it received a subsidy of over 220 million baht for Thai content production.
• Market promotion and export: Distributed to the Ministry of Commerce (Department of International Trade Promotion — DITP) for taking entrepreneurs on overseas road shows.
• Workforce upskilling (OFOS project): Budget embedded with the Creative Economy Agency and educational institutions. Based on monitoring reports by a House of Representatives committee in conjunction with Policy Watch, hundreds of millions of baht have already been spent (combined budget approved for 2024–2025 exceeded 970 million baht).
• Festivals and culture: Distributed to the Ministry of Tourism and Sports (TAT and SAT) and provincial budgets, with a focus on organising rotating events.
Drawing Lessons from Korea Compared to Thailand
When we look at the success story of a country that has exported its culture to the point of becoming a major economic engine — South Korea — through the work of KOCCA (Korea Creative Content Agency), and then turn back to examine the "Thai government model" through the OFOS project and the Soft Power Strategy Committee, the strategic difference is total. South Korea does not view soft power as a matter of "organising events" — it places its heart in building a "structurally driven export industry" from the very first step. Thailand, meanwhile, remains stuck in a bureaucratic academic rut, fixated on symbolic activities and creating short-lived impressions.
The sharp strategic differences, examined through 4 key dimensions, are as follows:
• Strategic focus: South Korea positions itself as a system-builder focused on constructing a legal ecosystem, tax incentives, and technological infrastructure to support record labels and the music industry so they are competitive in the global market. Thailand's model, by contrast, still functions merely as an event organiser — focused on holding festivals, setting up booths, and press conferences — meaning that money evaporates immediately once each event is over.
• Human capital support and development: KOCCA in South Korea uses an active financial subsidy approach, establishing subsidy funds and opening low-interest loan channels for record labels and music institutions to use in developing musicians and trainees, and conducting overseas market research. In contrast, Thailand's OFOS model focuses on blanket short-term training courses. Data from House of Representatives committee oversight and Policy Watch found that despite burning through enormous amounts of budget, the scheme produced only tens of thousands of actual programme completers — not even 0.1% of the 20-million-person target — amounting to nothing more than basic reskilling with no connection to the real needs of the industry, leaving artists like "Nene Royal" to fend for themselves in the search for a global stage.
• Infrastructure and law: South Korea prioritises investment in intellectual property, reform of international copyright laws, and the construction of world-class studios and music practice spaces. Thailand, meanwhile, continues to place its hopes in scattered training programmes, while laws protecting the labour rights of creative workers, and tax incentives for investors in the creative industry, remain completely frozen in place.
• Long-term systemic outcomes: When South Korean artists succeed, the enormous value and revenue from copyrights, streaming, and concert tours circulate back into domestic record labels, leading to sustainable investment in developing the next generation of artists. In Thailand's case, when a 16-year-old Thai child must build their name through a foreign television programme, the majority of the added value and benefits from programme contracts and management naturally flow to foreign companies, leaving behind only individual pride that the state then exploits to ride the wave day by day.
The saddest aspect of this policy is that the Thai state tends to seize the opportunity to congratulate itself and claim credit for artists' success on the day they have already made it to the world stage — but on the days when young people like Nene Royal have to practise guitar for dozens of hours a day in Phuket, or struggle to travel abroad to compete, the state is nowhere to be found in that ecosystem. The more than 8,000 million baht spent therefore has the character of a budget for buying short-lived impressions, rather than laying industrial foundations. And as long as the success metrics remain tied to the number of festival attendees, the Thai music phenomenon will only ever be a product that grows naturally — without any genuine structural support.
Solutions Before the Budget Goes to Waste
If the government wishes to shift from "riding the wave of individual success" to "building a new economic engine," the state must surgically reform three structural ways of thinking, as follows:
1. Convert event budgets into infrastructure development budgets: Redirect funding away from organising festivals and instead establish a "Matching Fund" to subsidise youth, record labels, and music institutions in sending artists to compete, train, or market themselves at the international level.
2. Reform laws that obstruct the creative industry: Improve copyright law to genuinely protect the intellectual property of musicians and artists, and establish a fair digital streaming revenue distribution system.
3. Attract foreign capital to build a base in Thailand: Create tax incentive measures to bring world-class entertainment companies and record labels to set up training institutions, co-production centres, and a music industry in Thailand, so that Thai youth can access world-class structures without having to fly elsewhere to grow.
If the government continues to slice up the 8,000-million-baht budget cake and distribute it to government agencies to hold press conferences and events... the conclusion for the Thai music industry and Thai soft power will not change. New stars like "Nene Royal" will continue to emerge — but they will only be able to rise to the world stage by walking out of Thailand.
Look back and read: Series — Soft Power and the Fate of Thai Artists, EP.1: From 'Nichkhun–Lisa' to 'Nene Royal' — Three Decades of Thai Children's Struggle: The State Can Only Ride the Wave!?
